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The Global Compact and Corporate Social Responsibility: A Field of Contention 
 On June 23, 2004 a network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil 
society actors, many of them associated with the Alliance for a Corporate-Free United Nations 
(ACFUN), held a public symposium to discuss the relationship between the United Nations (UN) 
and the issue of corporate accountability. The occasion for the event was another, quite different 
gathering, the Global Compact Leaders Summit being held the same day at UN headquarters. 
The Global Compact Counter-Summit, as the symposium was billed, was devoted primarily to 
voicing concern and criticism that the UN particularly through its Global Compact project, was 
becoming too closely tied to corporate interests and compromising its neutrality and integrity as 
an instrument of global governance. The following month representatives from ACFUN and 
other groups participating in the Counter-Summit issued a Joint Civil Society Statement on the 
Global Compact and Corporate Accountability calling for effective measures to enforce 
corporate accountability in areas such as human rights and the environment. (Joint Civil Society 
Statement, 2004) 
 As social movement researchers have noted, the growth of corporate power that has 
accompanied neo-liberal globalization has resulted in the development of a transnational social 
justice movement challenging corporate and government conduct around issues such as 
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inequalities, rights, social exclusion, and the environment (della Porta et al. 2006). The 
participants in the Counter-Summit were part of this broad network of activism aimed at calling 
corporate power to account, questioning the capitulation of governments to the interests of global 
capital, and contesting the ideological monologue of market supremacy. Less often recognized 
by observers of social activism, however, is the growth of a kind of corporate counter movement 
that recognizes the social as well as economic impact of corporate behaviour and the need to 
promote social responsibility on the part of corporations. While corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) has a long history, dating back to earlier forms of business philanthropy, it has recently 
taken a new lease on life as an attempt to respond to the concerns of neo-liberalism’s critics 
about the disruptive impact of market forces on civil society and social well-being. The Global 
Compact represents what is to date the most ambitious attempt to institutionalize CSR as a 
dimension of global governance. 
 The Global Compact (GC) was first mooted by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan at the 
1999 World Economic Forum. The GC itself was inaugurated the following year as a multilateral 
scheme involving participation from individual businesses, business associations, civil society 
organizations such as NGOs and labour union federations, and UN agencies. The centrepiece of 
the initiative was a code that comprised nine principles to which the Compact’s participants were 
asked to commit themselves. The nine principles pertained to three areas of concern--human 
rights, labour rights, and environmental protection--and were drawn from three existing 
documents, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labour Organization’s 
Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Earth Summit (United Nations 
Environmental Programme 2002). A tenth principle relating to financial probity and anti-
corruption was subsequently added to the code (Greenleaf Publishing 2004; United Nations 
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Global Compact 2006). The rationale of the code was to establish commitment to and consensus 
around universal principles at a global as opposed to national or regional level. 
 The GC was designed primarily as an instrument of socialization, a means to humanize 
and moralize the cold calculus of market rationality and its principal agents, transnational 
corporations (TNCs) (Williams 2004); hence it was closely associated with another, 
contemporaneous U.N. initiative, the Millennium Development Goals. The GC is an instrument 
of socialization in the double sense. It is designed to encourage social learning based on the best 
practices model of corporate performance, and to incorporate its participants into networks of 
interdependency and co-operation realized chiefly through communicative action. As is true of 
CSR generally, dialogue plays a central role in how the GC represents itself to the world. The 
Compact set out to achieve its goals in three ways. The first is the establishment of learning 
networks in which participating corporations report on their progress in promoting the ten 
principles. The second is through policy discussions among participants about appropriate 
corporate responses to problematic situations, such as operating in conflict zones. Both of these 
seem in practice to centre on helping corporations learn better avoidance behaviour, ie. on 
reducing the risk of being complicitous in rights abuses, environmental harm, or corruption. The 
third consists of public/private partnership projects aimed at tackling particular problems in 
developing countries, the most prominent to date being programmes to enhance awareness and 
prevention of HIV/AIDS. It is this latter mechanism that is the most oriented to concrete action 
where rights and security are imperilled.  
 In the spectrum of CSR initiatives the GC is best characterized as a promotional 
endeavour. It relies on voluntary compliance and self-policing on the part of its corporate 
participants, and does not entail any mechanisms of external monitoring, verification or 
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sanctioning to ensure the latter are actually living up to their commitments and claims. The GC 
typifies the attempt to develop alternative mechanisms of corporate governance to fill the gap 
created by the roll-back of state-centred forms of regulation in the face of neo-liberal hegemony, 
the growth of corporate power, and the emergence of new issues and problems resulting from 
globalization (Paine 2000). The initiative is a largely top-down attempt to generate a hybrid, 
voluntary system of engaging TNCs in socially and environmentally responsible practices in 
what has been termed the “new global public domain” by John Gerard Ruggie (2004), an 
academic who is the recently appointed U.N. special envoy on business and human rights and a 
former special advisor on the GC. 
 Since its inception, however, the GC has been subject to wide-ranging criticism. These 
criticisms fall into three related areas. The first is ideology. Many activists see the GC as another 
step in the direction of the U.N. becoming closer to the interests of TNCs, a process that began in 
earnest in the early 1990s with the closure of the U.N.’s Centre on Transnational Corporations. 
ACFUN and other activist organizations see the GC as compromising the political and 
ideological neutrality of the U.N. while providing an opportunity for participating TNCs to 
exploit the U.N.’s prestige for symbolic capital and public relations gains. Drawing on the 
communicational repertoire of the environmental movement, ACFUN and other critics have 
charged TNCs affiliated with the GC with “blue-washing,” wrapping themselves in the U.N. flag 
as a way to enhance their public image as ethically responsible (Transnational Resource and 
Action Center 2000; CorpWatch 2002). Rather than representing an unconditional capitulation to 
an untrammelled ideology of corporate neo-liberalism, however, others see the GC as redolent of 
‘third way’ politics that have attempted to give neo-liberalism a more social democratic face 
(Hughes and Wilkinson 2001).  
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 The second area of criticism concerns the institutional implications of the GC. Observers 
from different political perspectives acknowledge that globalization has been accompanied by 
the expansion of corporate rights and power by making nation state boundaries more permeable 
to economic transactions of all kinds (cf. Hughes and Wilkinson 2001; Paine 2000). This process 
is best symbolized by the growing importance of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its 
ability to impose legally enforceable constraints on national governments. There have, however, 
been no comparable institutional developments with respect to corporate obligations and 
responsibilities. As an attempt to address these obligations and responsibilities, the GC in no way 
matches the authority and capacity of the WTO. Equally importantly, the formation of the GC 
represents an institutional separation of rights and responsibilities on terms that are not only 
uneven but also free the WTO from the need to concern itself seriously with the social, 
environmental, and ethical side-effects of neo-liberal economics. While this institutional 
separation may diminish to some extent the WTO’s legitimacy, it nonetheless simplifies its remit 
in terms of business as usual. The GC becomes the premier global forum in which these issues 
are taken up, but chiefly in the form of communicative rather than material action. 
 The third area of criticism concerns the specifics of the GC’s aims, structure and 
procedures. The focus of criticism here has been largely what is missing, what the GC does not 
and cannot do, but should nonetheless be done. The core criticism here is that the GC is just yet 
another scheme that relies on voluntary participation and self-policing by TNCs. It lacks any 
legally binding, enforceable mechanisms to ensure TNCs are accountable for their actions and 
inactions. From the criticism of voluntarism flows a host of other reservations: viz. the GC lacks 
a system to monitor corporate behaviour, to ensure participating TNCs report on their conduct in 
an objectively measurable, transparent, and verifiable way, and to ensure that problems are 
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rectified successfully (Martens 2004; Simons 2004) . Putting the accent on promoting corporate 
responsibility through socialization and communicative action means that the GC fails to achieve 
corporate accountability in a legally effective way (Williams 2004). The ideological and 
institutional critiques of the GC converge with these organizational and procedural criticisms. 
The GC and CSR generally do not address the root problem of how the balance of cultural, 
political and economic power has been shifting in a direction that undermines democratic 
governance, nor do they offer a feasible instrument to promote social and economic development 
that is not compromised by the imperatives of competitiveness and profitability (inter alia 
Blowfield, 2005; Blowfield & Frynas, 2005; Frynas, 2005; Jenkins, 2005; Newell, 2005; Shamir, 
2004). 
 These criticisms have come from a variety of sources including academics and even 
observers within the U.N. system itself (Bendell 2004; Utting 2002). The most comprehensive 
and sustained criticism, however, has come from social activists who see voluntary CSR 
schemes as simply a means to reproduce and legitimate existing power relations rather than bring 
about social and economic development of a more equitable and sustainable kind. ACFUN was 
the most vocal critic in the GC in the early 2000s. It is a network centred on the U.S.-based 
corporate watchdog CorpWatch, and draws its affiliates from among Northern and Southern 
NGOs and activist organizations including the Brazilian Institute for Social and Economic 
Analysis, Corporate Europe Observatory, the Thailand based Focus on the Global South, and the 
International NGO Committee on Human Rights in Trade and Investment based in India. 
Concerns about effectiveness, however, have also been expressed from within the GC. After the 
2004 Leaders Summit, for example, NGO members of the Compact such as Amnesty 
International issued a public statement criticizing the initiative for falling “far short of 
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expectations” and calling for stronger measures to ensure corporate accountability (Amnesty 
International 2004). It is striking that the criticisms and recommendations from NGOs within the 
GC do not differ markedly from those being made by outside groups such as ACFUN. 
 The relationship between the GC and its civil society critics reflects general changes in 
the forms of contention and repertoires of action that have characterized the development of the 
global social justice movement. This movement is something of a hybrid of ‘old’ and ‘new’ 
social movements. Like the former, particularly the labour movement, it is concerned with issues 
of material inequality, security and social well-being; like ‘new’ social movements it is also 
oriented to issues of identity, cultural rights and autonomy. It has a reticular structure, 
comprising a fluid network, or network of networks, whose nodes are different groups, 
organizations and associations that come together out of shared interest in particular issues in a 
contingent and often temporary way (della Porta et al. 2006). This network structure has been 
facilitated by the development of new digital technologies, notably the Internet. These allow for 
low cost, instantaneous communication that enhances mobilization capabilities and greater 
flexibility and responsiveness in decision-making and campaigning. As Bennett (2003) has 
argued, communication has become the organizational logic of networked forms of social 
activism. 
 The importance of communication also extends to movement strategy and tactics. Social 
movements have long had an interdependent if somewhat tenuous relationship with the 
mainstream media (Smith et al. 2001). To some extent, however, this relationship has changed as 
the spread of digital media has decentralized and pluralized opportunities for alternative forms of 
communication. The implications are twofold. On the one hand, movements such as the social 
justice movement tend to function in terms of a strategy of permanent campaigning (Bennett, 
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2003). On the other hand, the targets of activism are varied and constantly shifting in response to 
new information, developments and events. As a result, the role of communication is accentuated 
as the logic that ties together different tactics at the same time that it also expands the 
movement’s tactical repertoire. An increasingly important dimension of activism, and one that is 
especially pronounced in the case of CSR initiatives like the GC, is the constant surveillance and 
monitoring of major institutions like corporations, governments and other governance bodies, 
and the accumulation, analysis and publication of information about their actions and inactions in 
the form of reports, newsletters, and other forms of public discourse (for example see inter alia 
Amnesty International 2005). Social justice activism has taken on an investigative, almost 
forensic, quality. Contention between social movements and their institutional targets 
increasingly involves the presentation and rebuttal of evidence, and gatherings such as the 
Counter Summit are a way in which activists not only parody the practices of their targets but 
also make evidence-based claims making publicly available for deliberation and debate.  
 
Contention and Power Relations  
 The enhanced role that communication plays in transnational social movements also 
speaks to shifting configurations of power relations. Social movement research has generally 
seen changes in the forms, frequency and intensity of contention in terms of the distribution of 
power and how this in turn shapes the distribution of other resources, opportunities, threats and 
grievances. While not discounting the importance of power inequalities, it is important to 
recognise that the forms, frequency and intensity of contention are also shaped by different 
modes or techniques of power, by different ways in which power can be exercised and resisted. 
The repertoire of activities that social movement networks undertake, from lobbying to protest to 
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humanitarian assistance to surveillance, monitoring and the dissemination of information is 
implicated in the exercise of power and the circulation of power effects. As Foucault has argued, 
modern forms of power in particular consist of more than simply practices of constraint and 
deprivation. Power is productive inasmuch as it brings about new forms of social interaction, 
relationship, knowledge, and capacity, and this productivity consists in the ways that the exercise 
of institutional power generates challenge and resistance. 
 Foucault’s conceptualization of power is particularly germane to understanding the 
struggle over issues such as corporate responsibility and accountability because it captures the 
dynamic, contentious and agonistic nature of power relations. This fluidity distinguishes 
relations of power from relations of domination, which are solidified, immobile and immune to 
resistance (Foucault 1988a). While relations of domination do not disappear in modern society, 
relations of power become increasingly prevalent inasmuch as social and political forces and 
capacities are focused on enhancing, shaping, and directing life and the social conditions of life, 
rather than on limitation and deprivation. Both power relations and relations of domination entail 
subjugation, but the two vary considerably in the ways that they function. Domination is 
unilateral, coercive and total; it functions through imposition; and its logic is repressive. Power, 
on the other hand, is the product and medium of social contingency (and the expansion of 
contingency is a defining feature of modernization). Power only functions in situations where 
those on whom it is exercised have the possibility of reacting otherwise. Contingency 
presupposes the possibility of different courses of action, and can therefore only be directed at 
those who exercise a measure of freedom over their actions. Those who exercise power may seek 
to totalize its effects, but these effects are never exhaustive as the contingency of power relations 
allows for resistance and even reversal. Power relations are multilateral and open-ended 
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inasmuch as contingency multiplies the techniques and instruments of power and changes its 
operational logic from imposition to intervention. Power functions primarily not through 
constraining and preventing, though it may result in these effects, but through producing new 
patterns of social practice together with discourses of knowledge and truth that legitimate and 
objectify these practices in an effective way.  
 Unlike domination, which acts in ways that are specific to particular situations or events, 
power functions continuously because the objective of producing and shaping conduct means 
that the exercise of power is more than a self-referential undertaking. The function of domination 
is to reproduce domination; the function of power is to produce something new, to induce, 
encourage, incite, and direct. Power is not a commodity that can be possessed and accumulated; 
it is a kind of energy that only exists in its exercise and ramifications (1980b). The exercise of 
power, moreover, is targeted not at people, but at their actions or conduct. Foucault (1988a) 
defines power in terms of the reflexivity of action, as an action upon action, whether someone 
else’s or one’s own. This means that the exercise of power seeks to internalize its effects in the 
subjectivity of those to whom it is directed, and become self-activating. Power, for Foucault, is 
about how we are made subjects in the dual sense: on the one hand, actors capable of self-
reflection and rational conduct, of knowing and being known; on the other hand, actors marked 
by subjugation, bound to themselves and others in relations that are asymmetric or hierarchical 
(1980a).  
 There are three aspects of Foucault’s analysis of the power/struggle nexus that are 
valuable for understanding contention around the GC and the struggle for corporate 
accountability. Firstly, power relations are bound up with the process of social problematization 
(Foucault, 2000). The exercise of power presupposes that some condition, event, or mode of 
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action is problematic in some way, and is capable of resolution or improvement. It is through 
problematization that the exercise of power is tied to the mobilization of ethical values and the 
production and circulation of knowledge in which the problematic is framed and explained. 
Secondly, Foucault (2003) argues that power does not function without resistance, struggle, and 
confrontation. The exercise of power is always (potentially) contentious. Power is leaky; the 
problems it addresses and seeks to subsume can escape its embrace to some extent, not the least 
because the exercise of power itself can be reflexively and contingently problematized. The 
organization and focus of resistance and struggle, thirdly, are determined by the particular ways 
that power is exercised. Power does not have a single, unitary identity or modality. It is finely 
differentiated in terms of the techniques through which it is exercised, the problems it addresses, 
and the ways that it can be resisted and attacked. Given the contingent nature of power, these 
techniques may complement one another or they may clash. Resistance and struggle are possible 
inasmuch as any technique of power can be challenged by deploying the same or some other 
technique of power as the basis for counter-claims, counter-demands, and counter-action. 
 
Problematizing of the Global Compact 
 Contention and controversy over the GC and corporate accountability have varied focal 
points and entail an array of different actors and interests. The field of contention is based largely 
on the triangular relationship between TNCs, the UN, and NGOs and other social movement 
organizations mobilized around social justice and environmental sustainability. Each of these 
comprises a network of individual actors whose own interests and stakes may vary and even 
conflict. Some international NGOs such as Oxfam and Amnesty International are participants in 
the GC, whereas others, such as Greenpeace, are not. The same is true for large TNCs and labour 
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movement organizations. More TNCs have been joining the GC, but it still seems to be viewed 
sceptically by US-based transnationals whose size and scope make them crucial to its long-term 
feasibility. Because of this triangularity, the lines of engagement are more complex than in 
bilateral forms of struggle. The GC is trying to influence and cajole TNCs into taking action to 
respect and support its ten principles, and to encourage NGOs to join and engage in partnerships 
with TNCs to facilitate ‘best practices’ learning. At the same time, activists are trying to put 
pressure on both the GC and TNCs to strengthen implementation, enforcement, and 
accountability measures with respect to human rights and environmental protection. TNCs, on 
the other hand, are generally attempting to resist stronger measures that they see as a tool to 
curtail their field of autonomy and advantage, while in many cases recognizing the need to 
espouse the discourse of social responsibility.   
 For its advocates, CSR initiatives are a solution rather than a problem. The problem lies 
in the social and environmental side effects of the expansion of market relations that threaten the 
latter’s long term viability. Neo-liberalism enhances the autonomy of the market, but the obverse 
is the increasingly transparent indifference, if not hostility, of the market to societal and 
environmental issues and values that cannot be calculated in terms of short-term cost and benefit. 
The property rights on which markets are based are exclusionary and resistant to democratic 
values that are not mediated through monetary exchange, and have given TNCs too narrow a 
view of their own identity and potential. From the viewpoint of CSR advocates, then, the 
fundamental problem is one of lack: corporations lack sufficient awareness of the problems that 
market globalization fosters as well as sufficient understanding of the role that they can and 
should play as ‘citizens’ in circumstances where governments do not have the will and/or 
capacity to act effectively to meet social and environmental needs. By casting this role in the 
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language of responsibility rather than obligation, CSR advocates soften both the attribution of 
causal blame for social and environmental problems and the strength of any normative 
requirement on TNCs to assume the costs and risks of remedial action.  
 There is nothing especially new in this discourse of the beneficent, ethically rational 
capitalist apart from a heightening of the stakes, particularly with respect to the environment. 
The theory of social economy arose in the early 19th century in response to the social problems 
resulting from the rapid growth of capitalism in Western Europe. What was deemed problematic 
was not the effect of market relations on the unequal distribution of wealth and power, but the 
impact of these inequalities on social relations and personal conduct. The problem was not 
poverty, which was seen as an incentive to industriousness and diligence, but pauperism, the 
tendency for many of the poor to be undisciplined, licentious, dissolute, unreliable, prone to 
criminality, and so on (Procacci 1991). The remedy lay in persuading capitalists to recognize 
their longer term, ‘enlightened’ self-interest in addressing these social problems through 
educational intervention to ensure that paupers became the respectable poor. Philanthropy, as 
opposed to charity, entailed initiatives to reform the conduct of those who lost out in the 
competition for market success rather than simply providing supplementary compensation. 
 The morally self-righteous language has since largely disappeared, but the essential 
narrative remains untouched: like philanthropy before it, CSR is a supplement and complement 
to market relations. What has changed, however, is the scale of the problems. Globalization has 
closed off the opportunity for the problematic side-effects of market relations to be externalized; 
there are no more empty spaces in which to relocate the system’s unwanted by-products, be they 
surplus populations or toxic emissions (Beck 1992).  Appeal to the enlightened self-interest of 
global capital can no longer be confined to the local level. The globalization of problematic side-
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effects has given rise to a new discourse oriented around sustainability, or rather the 
unsustainabilty of business-as-usual practices concerned only the maximization of short-term 
profit and shareholder value. Sustainability has obvious environmental connotations, and it 
signifies the way that the rhetoric of environmental responsibility has become a common aspect 
of the legitimation and reputation strategies of TNCs. Sustainability is also broad enough to 
subsume social as well as environmental problems but without the need to reform radically the 
imperatives, objectives or structures of the market system. Sustainability means simply finding 
less problematic ways to ensure system continuity and stability under conditions where 
externalizing social and environmental costs is less of an option. This turns CSR into a kind of 
prospective and pre-emptive form of crisis management.  
 In the case of the GC the problem is framed primarily in terms of rights and the 
responsibility of TNCs to respect and support these rights. The assumption behind the Compact 
is that respecting and supporting human, labour and environmental rights will help ensure long-
term viability of the global market system, enhance corporate legitimacy and enable TNCs to see 
the rational benefits of ethical practices. The GC rightly assumes that human, environmental, and 
labour rights are constantly under threat of violation and abuse. The notion of respecting and 
supporting rights, however, frames the relationship between TNCs and rights abuses in an 
indirect way, as complicity or ignorance rather than intent or indifference. In practice, therefore, 
respecting and supporting rights translate chiefly into better avoidance behaviour: avoiding 
situations in which one might benefit from abuses carried out by others (such as host 
governments). Even in the case of labour rights, where TNCs are most likely to be in a position 
to commit violations, the problem is still defined in terms of avoidance: avoiding the use of 
forced labour, interference in workers’ attempts to unionize, and discrimination in hiring and 
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firing. To respect, even to support workers’ right to freedom of association does not per se mean 
taking active steps to ensure that employees are unionized. Rights are notional. They entail the 
freedom to make claims or demands without fear of harm or disadvantage, but the realization of 
these demands is not necessarily guaranteed simply by the act of claims making.  
 For critics of CSR and the GC the problem is a mixture of excess and lack: excessive 
power and autonomy on the part of TNCs and lack of a framework to ensure and enforce TNC 
accountability on the part of the GC. Criticism of the GC is part of a larger opposition on the part 
of the global social justice movement to neo-liberalism and the growing autonomy of the market 
sphere at the expense mechanisms of social control and democratic accountability. While social 
movement activists also tend to frame the problem through the lens of rights, their argument is 
that voluntary, self-policing systems of CSR like the GC are seriously inadequate as they amount 
simply to a public relations exercise by TNCs whose public image is a primary ingredient of 
their marketing and consumer relations strategies. CSR simply continues earlier practices of 
corporate philanthropy by softening symbolically the hard edges of market-generated inequalities 
and inequities, and generating additional forms of social dependency on the interests of 
organized capital. For activists, then, the problem with CSR is threefold: it is far too weak a 
mechanism for controlling corporate power and conduct; it reinforces relations of social 
dependence that are not subject to democratic decision-making; and it functions as a way to 
enhance the commercialization and corporate control of the public sphere where debate over 
social issues is distorted by the power of public relations. 
 
Struggle and Strategy 
 Foucault insisted that wherever power relations function so too do relations of resistance, 
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and it is resistance that gives power relations their contingent character. Foucault (1983) 
identifies three different types of resistance or struggle: against domination, exploitation, and 
subjection or ‘subjectivization.’ Struggles against domination are directed at loosening the grip 
of sovereign or state control, and are usually organized in terms of the extension and 
‘reflexivization’ of legal rights (the right to rights). Struggles against exploitation are 
characteristic of the working class movement directed against economic power that separates 
people from the produce of their labour. Struggles against subjection are aimed at the exercise of 
power that ascribes differential social identities and ties people to these identities in 
individualizing ways. Although Foucault recognises that any struggle can involve dimensions of 
all three types, he argues that one type of struggle tends to be predominant in any concrete 
situation. These struggles form a broad historical sequence, beginning in early modernity with 
struggles against domination (against the absolutist state), followed by struggles against 
exploitation in the period of industrialization, and culminating in “struggles against subjection, 
against forms of subjectivity and submission” in late modernity (Foucault 1983, 212). 
 Foucault’s claim that struggles against subjection/subjectivization are becoming more 
important in late modernity echoes the argument that the focus of political contention is now 
concerned increasingly with ‘post-materialist’ values and the politics of identity or recognition 
that characterize the ‘new’ social movements (Bennett 1998). For Foucault, these struggles 
against subjectivization are “transversal” (occurring across societies), aimed at immediate power 
effects rather than underlying institutional structures, and concerned with both the status of the 
individual and the exercise of power based on “the privileges of knowledge” rather than other 
resources such as wealth or coercion (1983, 211-212). While this characterization fits many of 
the struggles associated with identity or recognition politics in late modern societies, it does not 
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fully represent a hybrid movement such as the global social justice movement. Activist 
challenges to the GC and CSR also resemble struggles against domination inasmuch as they 
support the extension and substantiation of rights in the face of repressive or undemocratic 
governments, and against exploitation to the extent that they seek to strengthen the power of 
workers via freedom of association and to eliminate forced and child labour.  
Where the movement challenging the GC and CSR does resemble struggles against 
subjection are in the areas of strategy and modes of activism. To the extent that struggles against 
subjection problematize identity and identity relations, they have a strong ethical and cultural 
component. Identity is first and foremost about the meaning and evaluation of the self (individual 
and collective), which lends itself to strategies of contention and repertoires of tactics that have a 
strong communicational orientation. In his analysis of power and strategy, Foucault (1983) 
argues that the exercise of power forms part of systemic “blocks” that also include relations of 
communication as well as relations of material resources and capacities. These sets of relations, 
while analytically discrete, are empirically superimposed and interactive; each is implicated in 
the realisation of the others–using “each other mutually as means to an end”–but in an uneven, 
contingent way (Foucault, 1983, 218). In the case of struggles against subjectivization, whose 
initial objective is to change understandings, the exercise of power accentuates relations of 
communication and the use of communicative action. 
 While the movement challenging the GC and CSR has objectives that entail much more 
than changing understandings, this remains the initial–and recurrent–problem that mobilization 
must address. This problem is shared by all universalistic or altruistic movements to the extent 
that their main constituents are not the primary intended beneficiaries of activism (Gamson 1975; 
Melucci 1996). The problem is intensified, however, by the transnational nature of the central 
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issues being addressed, viz. how to make TNCs more accountable for their human, labour, and 
environmental impact, particularly in the global South, and how to induce the GC to accept that 
stronger measures than a voluntary system of good intentions and self-reporting are needed. The 
movement is often dealing with problems that do not have an immediate, direct, or concrete 
impact in the global North. Threats to or the actual abuse of rights do not usually manifest 
themselves in the form of events that can easily be understood in terms of risk, crisis, or some 
other form of grievance conducive to large-scale mobilization. Framing, in other words, is 
problematic and this accentuates the communicational stakes in the development and deployment 
of movement strategy. 
 The transnational, network form of movement organization also enhances the 
communicational dimension of activism. The movement for social justice has to mobilize and 
coalesce a disparate and dispersed constituency of members and supporters whose activism is 
itself often primarily communicational–petitions, letters, placards, leaflets, posters, public 
protests, symbolic culture jamming. The challenges of constituency mobilization and co-
ordination are compounded by the need to establish lines of interaction with intended 
beneficiaries whose own social and cultural life contexts, experiences, and opportunities often 
differ significantly. Communication becomes critical as a means to manage these relationships, 
but also as a potential point of friction and additional problems whose solution lies partly in 
better communication. Communication becomes an integral and reflexive aspect of movement 
strategy that is key to ensuring the capacity to respond in a timely, flexible, and effective way to 
the actions of those who are better equipped with material and technical resources.  
 Because social movements typically lack access to significant material resources and 
capacities, communication-centred strategies are often directed at the exposure and ethical 
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denunciation of both the actions and credibility of institutional opponents. Activism depends for 
its own credibility on opening up the breach between what institutions say–their claims to ethical 
responsibility and responsiveness–and how they actually behave. Activists attempt to use CSR as 
leverage to demonstrate how actions fall short of, if not contradict, claims. In any field of 
contention, strategy comprises not only objectives and the means to achieve these, but also the 
process of attempting to deprive opponents of opportunities, meanings and other resources–their 
“means of combat” –to gain advantage (Foucault 1983, 225). By demonstrating not only how 
powerful institutions act in ways that are potentially harmful, especially to the socially 
vulnerable, but also how they are hypocritical and untrustworthy in failing to practise what they 
preach, social justice activists are able to mobilize additional normative resources that help to 
offset the disadvantages they face. By revealing the hypocrisy of their opponents, activists seek 
to deprive them of legitimacy by undermining trust, instilling doubt, and introducing risk into 
institutional environments.  
 The centrality of claims and counter-claims making to communicational politics carries 
with it the ‘post-modern’ dilemma: how does the public decide the validity and merit of 
different, contesting views. Activists have been able to exploit this dilemma by exposing not 
only the breach between the words and actions of their opponents, but also the contradictions 
within their opponents’ claims and practices. Critics of the GC, for example, have been able to 
use the UN against itself. In its criticisms of the GC ACFUN has used the existence of a stronger 
model to secure corporate accountability that has been developed elsewhere in the UN system, 
viz. the U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, also known as the U.N. Norms for Business (United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights 2003). The Norms call for more stringent control over 
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and accountability by TNCs than the GC’s code of principles. Using an opponent’s own norms 
and institutional processes as a basis for challenge helps to undermine credibility, reliability, and 
trust, and there are signs that this tactic has had some effect. While the GC still lacks any 
effective monitoring or binding decision-making capacity over its corporate affiliates, it has 
moved to strengthen what it calls “integrity measures” by introducing a third-party complaint 
mechanism and, in 2006, suspending the membership of 335 companies. What is striking, 
however, is that these companies were “delisted” not for failing to make progress in 
implementing the Compact’s principles, but for failing to communicate what progress if any they 
had made (Ethical Corporation 2007). 
 
Power and Counter-Power 
 Foucault argued that power is a force or energy that can only be identified in the manner 
of its exercise. Foucault’s analyses of power were always concerned with the how of power 
rather than the why, and were focussed on the diverse techniques for exercising power (Foucault, 
1988b). Foucault identified four different “technologies” or modes of power–sovereignty, 
disciplinary power, regulation or “biopower,” and pastoral power (inter alia Foucault, 1977, 
1983, 1988c, 2003). He saw each mode developing in something of a historical progression that 
begins with sovereignty in the pre-modern period, and extends into the modern period with the 
expansion of legal rights (the “democratization” of sovereignty), discipline, regulation, and 
secular forms of pastoral power closely tied to the growth and centralization of the state and its 
administrative apparatus. Each technology of power develops as social and demographic changes 
generate new problems that escape the purview of existing forms of power. For Foucault, the 
historical development of these different forms of power is cumulative as each new mode 
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problematizes and sharpens the functioning of existing modes rather than supplanting them. 
These different technologies of power become superimposed on one another and form a matrix 
of interacting techniques. 
 Each mode consists of particular techniques through which power is enacted, and 
operates at a particular level. Sovereignty functions largely through legal rights and the 
requirement that those subject to sovereign power respect and obey the law. Sovereignty is a 
totalizing mode of power inasmuch as legality, right and obligation apply to social aggregates 
such as populations. Discipline functions through techniques such as regimented drilling, 
training, surveillance, and testing aimed at making bodies more productive, efficient and pliable 
or docile at the level of local institutions such as workplaces and schools. Discipline operates on 
an individualizing level. It is aimed at social normalization by making individual actions visible 
and legible to authority, and by encouraging self-discipline through the internalization of self-
monitoring. Regulatory power also has normalizing or regularizing functions but these are 
oriented to the promotion of security and the management of threats or risks to life at the level of 
populations. Regulation is realized through the application of science to measure, forecast and 
generate knowledge about threats, and the implementation of standards and practices to assure 
the conditions that sustain life in areas such as health, hygiene, and public safety. Pastoral 
techniques, which are religious in origin and are revived and secularized in the modern period, 
consist in the exercise of power through care-giving oriented to individual welfare, self-
knowledge, responsibility, and solidarity at the level of local communities.  
 Sovereignty (legal rights), discipline, regulation and pastoral techniques extend and 
intensify the effects of power throughout all levels of social and personal life, and establish 
different rationalities for the exercise of power (order and justice, security and risk management, 
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well-being and solidarity). Power relations infuse the “capillary” level of social life as the 
exercise and effects of power spread everywhere in the form of legal rights, socialization, 
regulation, normative and technical standards, surveillance, risk management practices, 
measurement procedures, testing, care-giving, confessional practices, and so on. The obverse of 
this growth in the differentiation and reach of power effects is a gradual narrowing and reduction 
in the capacity of the social system to externalize problems as a way of resolving them. The 
growth and differentiation of power techniques is a response to this narrowing but also a factor 
that contributes to it by investing social spaces and processes with the rationalities of power. In 
this way, the permeation of power simultaneously intensifies the problematization of life as the 
exercise of power rebounds back on itself as an additional source of contentiousness: rights can 
conflict with rights, discipline can alienate, regulation can become rigid, and pastoral techniques 
can create dependency. As Foucault insisted, all forms of power are “dangerous” (2005, 266). 
 Power not only invests social relations with legal, disciplinary, regulatory, and pastoral 
force, it also makes these relations contestable as points of challenge where the exercise of power 
is resisted, evaded, even reversed. What this speaks to, however, is not a dichotomy of power 
and resistance, but to resistance as the exercise of counter-power. As Foucault (1980b) noted, the 
exercise of power by one means is resisted by the deployment of power by other means. 
Resistance does not function outside the logic of power; it is a reaction to an action upon actions. 
We invoke rights to limit the effect of discipline or regulation; we call for regulation and care-
giving to offset the realization of rights for some at the expense of others; and those who 
challenge the exercise of power often succeed best when they impose some measure of discipline 
on themselves. Resistance compounds the logic of power while nullifying or qualifying its 
effects with the counter-effects of other kinds of power. 
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 The historical evolution of these different modes of power means that their relationship to 
one another is uneven. Contention over the GC and CSR demonstrates how legal right remains 
the primary point of reference for the exercise of power in ways that are not only legitimately 
binding but also accountable. Legal rights dovetail with regulatory modes of power inasmuch as 
both are totalizing in scope, and therefore lend themselves to the exercise of and challenge to 
power at the aggregate level of social relations. The struggle over the GC is in this sense 
straightforward in its objectives, viz. to replace a voluntary system of self-monitoring, -reporting, 
and -correction with a more binding, enforceable system of sanctionable regulation and 
accountability. The problem is that this goal cannot be implemented from within civil society 
alone, without governmental power. This problem is compounded by globalization inasmuch as 
TNCs are often most likely to be complicitous in rights abuses or environmental harm in 
developing countries where governments lack the will and/or capacity to implement and enforce 
protection of rights. Moreover, enormous disparities in material resources, as well as the neo-
liberal privileging of property rights and market discipline over social welfare, have meant that 
TNCs enjoy far greater access to governments than do civil society groups.   
 Although civil society lacks the legally binding capacity to sanction corporate and 
governmental actors, it can nevertheless use the public sphere to pressure and influence these 
actors. Invoking and promoting the U.N. Norms for Business is not only a tactical device to gain 
leverage by using the U.N. against itself, it is also a more effective strategic tool to regulate 
corporate conduct, and to ensure compliance with and support and promotion of human and 
environmental rights. The U.N. Norms for Business constitute a more stringent regulatory code 
that could eventually impose definite obligations and responsibilities on corporations in a way 
that identifies the boundaries between property rights and human rights. Unlike the GC’s ten 
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principles, which are defined in very general terms, the U.N. Norms for Business spell out in 
some detail the measures that TNCs should take to respect and implement labour rights 
(including the protection of children from economic exploitation), human rights, national 
sovereignty, consumer protection, and environmental protection.   
 The most significant difference between the U.N. Norms for Business and the GC is the 
fact that the Norms emerged from the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, while the GC 
represents a wholly new institutional creation.  Because of their institutional location as part of 
the existing international human rights machinery, the U.N. Norms for Business will require 
greater scrutiny of TNC activity as it relates to human rights. The discussions around the Norms 
have noted that the discrepancies of power between states and corporate actors require efforts to 
hold non-state actors accountable to international human rights laws, even though governments 
are technically the responsible parties to international treaties.  The creation of a new 
institutional arrangement through the GC should then be seen as a conscious attempt to skirt 
established U.N. practices for human rights monitoring and reporting.   
In 2005, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights authorized the creation of a Special 
Representative on the issue of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations and other Business 
Enterprises whose mandate includes the development of standards of corporate accountability 
and methodologies for assessing the impact of business activities on human rights. Amnesty 
International, a major NGO participant in the GC, has actively worked to promote the Norms in 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and to educate the public and human rights practitioners 
about them. Amnesty International’s website devotes hardly any attention at all to the GC while 
providing extensive background on the history and current status of the Norms. These two 
competing schemes for global CSR offer substantially different possibilities for regulating the 
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practices of TNCs.  Because the Norms threaten to bring new scrutiny to corporate practices 
regarding human rights, they have faced strong resistance from TNCs, and one might also argue 
that they encourage more businesses to participate in the GC as way of heading off any effective 
international monitoring and sanctioning of corporate actions. 
The elaboration of rights and the implementation of regulatory codes are necessary but 
not sufficient conditions to achieve corporate, and governmental, responsibility and 
accountability. Rights and regulation presuppose universality (rights) and standardization 
(regulation), which gives them breadth of coverage and enables them to be exercised at a 
distance through the institutional mediation of criminal, civil, and administrative law. But as 
modes of power they are also leaky, and would remain so even if global institutional complexity 
did not expand the possibilities for evading legal and regulatory norms, and governments were 
committed to enforcing these norms. When legal requirements or regulatory standards are seen 
as restrictive, meeting them becomes a matter of the minimal level of performance necessary to 
avoid violation or non-compliance. Norms and standards easily become formalized, and this 
encourages a literalist interpretation that circumvents and threatens to undermine the concrete 
benefits that they are intended to achieve. This is particularly so under competitive conditions in 
which national government capacity and desire to implement transnational legal and regulatory 
structures have been weakened by neo-liberal hegemony. One way to offset the restrictive 
implications of legal and regulatory structures may be to tie them to incentive structures. For 
example, the US-Cambodia textile agreement offers a model for incorporating the effective 
regulation of labour standards into international trade agreements between developing and 
developed countries (Wells, 2006). The agreement illustrates the feasibility of expanding 
regulatory oversight of human, consumer, and environmental as well as labour rights in 
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developing countries via trade and development arrangements that secure market access and 
other forms of advantageous treatment in return for compliance with rights and standards.  
One of the principal insights of Foucault’s conceptualization of power is that different 
techniques of power work on different social levels and are organized in terms of different 
rationalities of value. Because modes of power are not only leaky but also dangerous, different 
techniques of power have to be used not only to complement but also to offset one another. Any 
attempt to make TNCs, governments and other central institutions more responsible and 
accountable by submitting them to effective democratic governance has to deploy techniques of 
power on both the macro and micro levels: rights and regulation have to be supplemented by 
disciplinary and pastoral techniques such as surveillance, monitoring, instruction, and provision 
of the means of material, social, intellectual, and emotional well-being at the local level. What 
facilitates this is the way that modes of power at the macro and micro levels are complementary 
in terms of their value rationalities. Though they function on different levels, discipline and 
regulation are oriented to order, security, and efficiency, while rights and pastoral techniques 
pertain principally to welfare, equity, and social cohesion. For each couplet, the mode of power 
at the local level is the means of substantiation of the mode of power at the macro level. 
 At the micro level, power functions through proximity rather than at a distance, and this 
reduces the possibility of mediating the ways that power is exercised. For civil society actors 
such as NGOs proximity is risky, not least because it carries the possibility of compromise or 
dependency. It is precisely this kind of risk that the GC itself poses inasmuch as it may function 
as a forum to regulate and discipline its civil society participants by incorporating them within an 
institutional framework of standardized procedures and practices. When power is exercised 
through proximity, autonomy is at stake. To preserve and enhance autonomy, activists and other 
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civil society actors that lack material resources and are faced with restricted opportunity 
structures have to reduce risk by means of risk: they have to replace distance with uncertainty. 
Civil society actors have to deploy communication in ways that use the public sphere as an 
instrument of risk inducement in corporate and governmental environments. It is by making 
these environments uncertain and unpredictable that civil society actors can enhance their own 
autonomy and exert more effective pressure on institutional power centres in the direction of 
democratic responsibility and accountability. To accomplish this means engaging with 
corporations and governments on terms that are contingent and conditional rather than 
institutionally standardized. 
 
Conclusion 
 Our analysis has sought to apply Foucault’s conceptualization of power to the efforts by 
the international community to respond to corporate violations of human rights and other global 
norms.  While this problem is defined in terms of rights and the balance of rights, it is also an 
issue of the different ways in which power is exercised on both the macro and micro levels of 
social organization, as well as different rationalities of value that the exercise of power 
addresses. We have shown how the attempts to expand global CSR regimes through the UN 
Global Compact and the UN Norms for Business have been limited in their ability to impact 
actual practices, and this is largely due to the fact that these arrangements fail to address 
fundamental imbalances of autonomy as well as disciplinary and regulatory powers between 
TNCs and states.  Moreover, neoliberalism has undermined the pastoral or care-giving capacities 
of states, further eroding their ability to respond to the challenges of economic globalization.  
Attempts to promote CSR as a remedy to corporate violations of social norms are problematic in 
that they have only minimal effects on autonomy as well as disciplinary and regulatory power.  
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What becomes clear is that any attempt to curb effectively socially harmful corporate practices 
will require efforts to restructure fundamentally power relations between states, international 
institutions, and TNC.  Instead of serving as partners to global CSR schemes, civil society actors 
would be more effective if they work to reclaim the state—by which we mean re-asserting its 
autonomy from markets as well as its disciplinary, regulatory and provisionary power over them.   
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